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I Introduction - the Theoretical Framework 
*@The State", as a class construct (as opposed to approaches which emphasize 
the statets neutrality or the importance of 6lites), is a funhnental to all schools 
of Marxist the-t. But the precise way in which the state operates so as to 
guarantee the interests of the dominant classes and the precise delimiWtion of the 
term "dominant classes" are subject to much debate. 
The state, like capital, is to be seen as a relation - it has existence only 
within the class struggle (1) and acts so as to maintain the cohesion of the whole 
social foraation and hence to reproduce the politico/ideological domination of the 
dominant classes. However, one of the characteristics of a capitalist social formation 
is the coexistence of several dominant classes (dependent on articulation with other 
modes) and, more importantly, of fractions within the dominant capitalist class (based 
on differing roles in the expanded reproduction of capital). Classes and fractions 
within the dominant classes have both common interests (corresponding to the 
maintenance of relations of exploitation in general) and contradictory interests 
(corresponding to their particulaz place in the relations of exploitation). This 
contradictory unity of the dominant classes, in addition to the fact that the state 
under capitalism allows for all of the dominant classes/fractions to be represented 
within the institutions of the state itself (2),  results in the phenomenon of what 
Poulantzas has termed '!the power bloc". This concept thus expresses the coexistence 
of several classes/fractions in the process of political/ideological domination. 
Since, however, the dominant classes/fractions have contradictory interests 
there is always a class struggle within the "power blocIt to be the dominant element 
within this bloc, i.e. the hegemonic class or fraction. Therefore, there can never be 
a simple sharing out of state power. By achieving the position of hegemony with L 
respect to the power bloc and the whole social formation, that class/fraction is able 
to assert the primacy of its particular interest. 
Vower bloc" and "hegemony" are integral concepts Tn any assessment of 
changes in "the form of state" (the periodization of the state). The critical questions 
in any analysis of the Capitalist State revolve around, firstly, the composition of 
Ifpower blocw and its allied classes a d ,  secondly, critically in South Africa, the 
hegemonic class/fraction. These are themselves the outcome of the class struggle. 
In an earlier paper, I outlined why hegemony had passed, in the aftemath 
of the 822 strike, from that fraction of capital I identified as "foreign" or 
"metropolitanff (pimarily the mining and secondly the commercial fractions) to that 
fraction of capital I identified as Hnationalll (primarily capitalist agriculture and 
secondly the industrial fraction). (3) For any peripheral social formation, where 
there has been a major development of indigenously based capital, this division will 
be a dominant one within the power bloc. In South Africa, the concentration of 
foreign capital largely within gold-mining and the independence of capitalist 
agriculture from foreign ownership and control meant that this division was 
reinforced by the fact of its coincidence with particular sectoral interests. 
Having outlined, albeit very briefly, the paradigm within which the ~~alysis 
operates, this paper is concerned to establish the following: 
1. In respect of hegemony, despite appearances and some contemporary 
rhetoric to the contrary, this remained with "nationaltf capital 
,and did not revert to mining or "foreignff capital with the advent 
of coalition/fusion government. Moreover, the composition of the 
power bloc did not alter, except marginally in respect of one of 
its "allies", i.e. white labour. 
2. If this analysis is correct, how are we to understand the 
phenomenon of coalition/" fusion"? In brief, the answer advanced 
here is that this phenomenon belongs to a different lffieldlf - not 
to changes in the "form of state" but to a change in the "form of 
regime". 
The Depression - the State's Response 
"Coalition", and subsequently fffusion" government, was not in South Africa, 
as it was elsewhere in this period, a direct response to an economic crisis per se. 
Firstly, the depression was relatively mild in South Africa, by comparison with almost 
, all other countries. Secondly, and most important, the depression was not "a 
generalized crisis of Capitalism" - its uneven impact was its central feature. 
For &ld thining, indeed this was a period of notable expansion and profits 
and dividends paid rose significantly. Given a stable price level for its output and 
declining world price levels in respect of some of its inputs, the mines were prosperous 
throughout this period. In addition, the mines were in the unparalleled situation of 
experiencing a "very satisfactory" labour supply situation as the depression adversely 
affected the other sectors of the economy. (4) For manufacturing, the year 1929-30 was 
still one of expansion and, altho- net income and employment declined subsequently, 
there was no disinvestment throughout the depression years. The expansion in g~ld 
;&lining, given the level of tariff protection prevalent, as a result of the Pact 
governmentls Custom Tariff Act of 1925, cushioned the effect of the Depression for the 
manufacturing sector. Agriculture, on the other hand, was severely hit, as a result 
of tumbling export prices, and net income for this sector fell by an astronomical 4% 
in the period 1927/8-1932/3. 
Finally, the upturn in economic activity was evident by October 1932, and 
was certainly under w q  immediately that South Africa abandoned the gold standard. 
Thus, coalition was not a government formed to solve a general econornir; 
crisis affecting the whole of the power bloc, and certainly "fusion", late in 1954, 
was not such a response - the upturn in activity already being significant. 
Given the differential impact of the depression, the critical question was 
how the state would "hold the ringff with respect to the struggles between the 
different fractions of capital over ffeconomicff policies. The statevs lfeconomictt 
policies in the depression period provide a further index of the hegemony of 
ifnationaltf capital. 
To assist agriculture, numerous measures were adopted relating to the 
maintenance of domestic prices at levels far in excess of prevailing international 
prices, for a wide range of commodities. For example, the percentage of the local 
price for wheat that represented a premium over international prices rose from 9% in 
1929 to 5009 in 1931. (5) Special bonuses were paid to hard hit exporters, including 
a 1% bonus to alf primary commodity exporters (excluding gold, diamonds and sugar), 
which were significantly increased for major agricultural exports early in 1932. (6) 
These export bonuses were financed directly thro@ a general primage cluty 
and a further surtax on all imports. Manufacturing supported these measures, for, 
altho@ they served to raise industry's cost structure, they also increased the level 
of effective protection. Moreover, they prevailed upon the government to tighten up 
on protec-bion t h r o  the imposition of exchange dumping duties which were frequently 
and liberally raised. (7) 
With both fractions of ffnational" capital receiving a large measure of 
protection, much of the incidence fell on the mining industry. Directly, they were 
saddled with duties on equipment previously imported free, increased direct taxation, 
higher food prices and major increases in the rate charges on the railways. 
Indirectly, the downward flexibility of prices and wages, which orthodox theory held 
were indispensable if the standard were to be maintained, was prevented by governmental 
action. 
In brief, state fleconomic" policies, consonant with the hegemony of 
ffnationalff capital, were differential in their application - the incidence falling 
largely on the mining industry. 
The Gold Standard Crisis - a Crisis of Political Representation 
These economic policies followed by the Hertzog government in protecting the 
markets of "nationalff capital had a major effect on the attitude of mining capital to 
the critical issue of the period - the gold standard. The Chamber in fact initially 
supported the government's insistence on maintaining the gold standard, following 
Britain's abandonment of the standard in September 1931, but within two months it had 
declared its unequivocal opposition. One of the primary reasons for this reversal was 
that the widely predicted international monetary collapse failed to materialize; 
secondly, as the President of the Chamber explained, adherence to the standard 
necessitated a policy of reducing production costs, but ffThe country is not following 
a policy consistent with these essentials of gold standard maintenance. Money 
expenditures are not being reduced to any material extentf1. He singled out export 
subsidies and special import duties as If.. presenting a policy that cuts across, and 
is contradictory of, the policy necessitated by effective adherence to the gold 
standard. The corollary of maintaining that standard is to meet export and industrial 
difficulties by reduction of costsff. (8) In its budget of 1932, the government 
increased the rate of taxation on, the gold mines (from 15% to 20%) to help meet r?tate 
assistance to agriculture - a measure that Patrick Ikuzcan (paradoxically,given hi:; 
later role) denounced as ffintolerable". (9) It was clear that continued adherence to 
the standard would involve the mines in ever escalating costs imposed by the state in 
order to aid national capital, 
Like mining, and for similar reasons, commerce initially supported the 
government but were quick to reverse their policy and, as early as October 1931, were 
urging abandonment. (10) In evidence to the Select Committee, they claimed that 8% 
of their members favoured abandonment and their spokesmen were in the forefront of 
urging abandonment throughout 1932. (11) ASSOCOM spoke for many industrialists too, 
but the primary organization of industrialists - the Federated Chamber of Industries - 
vacillated. At a special convention on the 18th January 1932, they could arrive at 
no decision on the issue. However, in their evidence to the Select Committee, they 
strongly urged abandonment. While they explicitly recognized the beneficial effects 
of state policy in respect of exchange dumping duties and other measures, the 
maintenance of the standard was said to be adversely affecting the whole econoqy. (12) 
The evidence of the South African Agricultural Union to the sane committee 
reveals very clearly the contradictory position of agricultural capital in respect of 
their principal party political representation. The gold standard had become the 
pre-eminent party political question of the day - the SAP having declared for 
abandonment and the Nationalist-led government adamantly for maintenance. In such a 
situation, the SAAU was not prepared to advocate abandonment openly, and stated that 
they regarded this as "pusely a matter for the State" - they did not want to get 
"mixed upT1 in party politics. However, the whole import of their evidence was that 
maintenance was pricing them out of their principal overseas markets a d ,  while they 
were very appreciative of the state's "very able attempts to place the South African 
farmer in a very favourable position", such measures were proving insufficient m d  
abandonment had, in fact, become an urgent necessity. (13) The only significant 
supporters of the government's stand were the representatives of organized labour 
(~rades and Labour Council and Cape Federation of Labour unions). However, even 
their support was very lukewarm and was based on their fear of inflation in the event 
of abandonment and their incapacity to maintain real wages in such a situation. 
Smuts summarized the position accurately when he declared that, despite the 
Majority Report supporting the retention of the Standard, 
!'The two great commercial banks, the chamber of commerce, the 
chamber of trade and all the important bodies that came before 
the Committee gave evidence which was either greatly against 
the Gold Standard or tended strongly in that direction. The 
only possible exception is the Agricultural Union, which 
althow making out a strong case for the abandonment of the 
Gold Standard,' did not wish openly to say so - and did not 
wish to get mixed up with what has become a big political 
controversy. But the evidence of the Agricultural Union is 
as strsngly against the maintenance as any other evidence 
given. 'l (14) 
The Hertzog government's stubborn refusal to abandon the dtandard when both 
f'nationalll and "foreign" fractions of capital were strongly advocating such a, policy, 
represented a disjuncture between the generalized interests of the power bloc and 
"the state" and a pronounced dislocation between the interests of the hegemonic fraction 
and their party politi'cal representation. How are we to understand this dislocation? 
The resolution to this problem rests in making the correct differentiation 
between what Poulantzas has termed "the political scene" and "the sphere of political 
practices1!. (15) The llpolitical scene" is defined as "a privileged place in which the 
open actions of social forces can take place by means of their representation by 
parties1!. Hence it relates specifically to the co-ordinates of class repreaentation 
through political parties, and this field is governed by the concept "form of r6ghcf1. 
"The sphere of political practices", on the other hand, is governed by the concept 
"form of statet1 and is a much wider concept, covering the whole field of political 
class struggle - of which the "party political" is only one aspect. 
The "form of state" sets the boundaries for transformations in the "form 
of r6gime" (i.e. by circumscribing the functioning and sphere of operations of the 
political parties [16]) but, within these boundaries, it does not determine "the 
form of r6gimew for transformations in the llfonn of r6gimeW have their own distinct 
rhythm (e.g.Ifthe laissez-fairetf capitalist state can take on a variety of lfformsfl). 
Since both concepts relate to particular co-ordinates present in their own fields, we 
cannot merely reduce political party relationships to class relationships and vice 
versa, and this is particularly apparent where a disjuncture occurs, as between a 
class or fraction political interest and its party representation. (17) 
What we are dealing with, in this period in South Africa, is sssentially a 
change in "form of r6gime11 and not in the constitution of the "power bloc"; not an 
alteration in hegemony but precisely a pronounced dislocation between political 
in~terest and party representation - this dislocation to be situated in the policies of 
the Rertzog government with regard to the &old standard crisis. (18) 
This dislocation between class interest and the party political representation 
of this interest foimd its expression in the proliferation of political parties m d  
quasi-political orffanizations of this period. There are definite indications that 
"the Roosites" received support not only from agriculture but also from elements in the 
mining industry. (19) The moves towards secession from the Union by the Natal r- i~eiiibers 
of the SAP gathered momentum, and on 4th June 1932 they formed a "Natal federal group 
as a wing of the South Africa Party and to be bound by the caucus of the groupff. (20) 
As the ranks of the Nationalist Party gTew restive and there were complaints of 
Hertzogls autocratic rule, individual dissident MPS formed small splinter parties - a 
"Republican Party" and a "Fanner and Worker's Party". (21) A "Centre Party" was formed 
by Dr A. J. Bruwer, who resigned as Chairman of the Board of Trade and Industries, and 
other "civil servantsff seem to have been involved. Their primary policy on the 
economic level was devaluation of the South African pound, and ff&astic protection for 
l 
our industriesff, while on the political level they called for an end to the two-party l 
system and the institution of proportional representation. (22) Amongst industrialists 
and commercial men there were frequent calls for the direct representation of business 
in parliament. A variety of quasi-political organizations were begun by then, such as 
a variation of the Canadian "Douglas Social Credit Movement" (which blamed the 
depression on the financial system), the "National Non-Party Government League" (23), 
and a coalitionist movement which aimed to unite all classes against foreign 
imperialism. (24) Since 1920 the representation of the interests of capital had been 
effected within an essentially two-party system, but this was now overtaken by a 
mushrooming of partie$ such as South Africa had not seen before nor has seen since. 
Wile the impetus towards coalition would seem to have come from the SAP 
(the influence of the mines hqre Ys fundamental - see p .6), farming elements, too, 
supported such moves, either through support for Roosts platform of a national 
government or acting independently. Moreover, the impetus towards the lffusionw of the 
parties - the real restructuring ,at the party political level - would seem to have 
rested with the farmers, particularly in the Transvaal. (25) The act of fffusion" 
served to re-establish the identity of both the interests of the power bloc and those 
of the hegemonic fraction with their political representatives. (26) 
Of course, coalition/"fusion" - a phenomenon at the party political level - 
did not magically dissolve the contradictions within the power bloc over the whole 
field of political class practices. Co-operation at the party political leve1,for 
which the term "entente" i6 often reserved (as opposed to "allianceff to denote 
co-operation at the level of "political practices"), often masks intense rivalry at 
the level of flpolitical practices". The existence of distinct "lobbiesfl,within the 
coalition and then the United Party, were an obvious indication, at the party 
political level, of the continuing contradictions. This was particularly evident in 
the debates over the Budget of 1933 in respect of taxation of the mines and, the 
reverse side of the same coin, the subsidization of agriculture. 
The llEconomicl' Policies of the "Fusion" Government 
The abandonment of the gold standard at the end of 1932 had the immediate 
result of, raising mining revenues from 85/- per fine ounce to over 120/- per fine 
ounce. While agriculture, too, received some relief from abandonment, the principal 
cause of its depression - low export prices - remained, and hence the "differential 
impactft of the depression was even exacerbated. Clearly, the critical question was 
how the Hertzog government proposed to deal with this situation and, in particular, 
what action it would take in respect of the so-called "Gold Premium". 
There were indications that the Nationalist government was contemplating 
taking most, if not all, of the premium (27), and one of the principal benefits -to 
the mines of a coalition government would be precisely to prevent this from happening. 
Thus, in the po-confidence debate preceding coalition, when Smuts called for a 
national government he was accused by the Minister of Justice as merely acting to 
protect the mines - a charge reiterated by the Minister of the Lnterior. "f-k is . 
since that time when it became known that it could be expected we would tax the 
extraordinary pro'jects on exchange, that the State was going to take a reasonable 
share of the profits of the mines, that their demands became so urgent." (28) 
Certainly, amongst the principal sponsors of the coalition were to be found the most 
eminent members of the Chamber of Mines - Bailey, Oppenheimer and, in particular, 
John Martin, President of the Chamber, who used his significant influence with both 
Smut8 and Duncan to initiate discussions leading to coalition. (29) 
The major features of the new coalition budget were, however, the generous 
provision of aid to agriculture and the acess Profits Tax (EPT). The latter was 
essentially a tax levied upon the profits made by the mines as a consequence of the 
increqsed price of gold. Since one of the effects of the increase in price was that 
a lower grade of ore was worked, profits were less than the premium. To the excess 
profits, after a complex system of allowances, a tax of 7@ was applied overall and 
this worked out to approximately 500/0 of the' remium - hence the so-called "50/50 
arrangementf' between the state q d  the mines- The net result was that the 
state took £6m. over and above what the additional profits of the gold mines would 
have yielded under the pre-coalition taxation system. In 1932, the mines gained 
working profits of -215.3m. and paid tax of S4.6m., and in 1933 the respective figures 
were £ 31.5m. and £14.9m. (31) 
The EPT would seem to have been drafted by Havenga prior to the election of 
20th MW. (32) None the less, during the election campaign, Duncan particularly 
led the mLines into believing that the new government would not increase mining 
taxation materially. (33) The reaction of the mines was one of surprise and intense 
hostility. Protest meetings were held all over the Reef, the Reef mayors dutifully 
travelled to Cape Town to demand "a fairer tax", the heavy guns of the mining 
industry thundered publicly and privately, and the English press that they controlled 
demanded a repeal of the proposals while share prices tumbled. (34) At the party 
political level, there was an almost outright rebellion of Rand W s  against the 
measure and the whole Rand ekecutive of the SAP strongly condemned the proposals. 
In response to the agitation, Duncan, as Acting Minister of Finance, granted 
a number of concessions. (35) The most important of these were to place definite 
limits on the tax yields for the next five years - B6m. in the first year, £7 .b. in 
the second year, and for the t-e subsequent years a maximum of 500/0 of excess profits, 
These concessions were significant but the government was not prepared to 
reduce the scale of taxatfon, an@ in 1936 it was indeed increased somewhat (following 
a shortfall in the previous year), while in 1939, in the face of bitter protest, the 
State proposed to take all revenue over and above 150/- per fine ounce. (35) 
Direct taxation of the gold mines provided fully 1/3 of all state revenues 
in the period 1933-39 (E98.5m. out of a total £295.7m.), and it was on the basis of 
%his revenue that generous state assistance to agriculture was rendered feasible, in 
addition to intensive infrastructural development, further development of the steel 
industry, etc. State assistance to agriculture, in this period, took essentially 
three foms: 
1. Direct expenditures (largely from loan f'unds and largely irrecoverable). 
Between 1927/8 and 1938/9, state expenditures increased fastest in the 
categories of wiculture (45296) and irrigation (407%). (37) 
2. Specia3 assistance expenditures. Between 1931/2 and 1938/9 over 820.5m. 
was so spent - the principal items being export subsidies (E10.a. ) and 
interest subsidies (&&I.). (38) 
3. Price subsidization measures - affecting virtually every commodity sold 
internally. Cost estimated at £7.5m.+ in 1933 and £5m.+ in 1939/40. (39) 
In 193Ts the Marketing Act gave wide powers to a National Marketing Council to undertakcz 
single chamnel marketing, fix prices, prohibit imports, etc., subject only to the 
control of the Minister. The Mines strongly condemned this Act on the familiar pou.nd 
that it would raise food prices ELnd hence wages. Industry, too, were concerned about 
the effect on wages and prices but they were prepared to support the Act, in return 
for &griculturet S continuing support for industrial protection. (40) Clearly, over 
%he question of protection, the interests of "nationalIf capital were united and 
mtagmistic to those of "foreignv capital. 
In respect of industrial protection there was much agitation for its 
reduction by those who were anxious to achieve reductions in "the cost of livingf1 
(notably the dines). A Customs Tariff Commission was appointed in September l934 to 
examine the question but its terms of reference were so narrow as to ensure that it 
could not recommend any fundamental alterations of policy. Moreover, they made no 
mention of imperial preference, which Buts had declared he would reinstate on coming 
into office. (41) Nevertheless, the Report was not favourable to protection, declaring 
that the policy had If. . reached the limits that the country could reasonably bearn.(42) 
Although a few reductions of duty were made, following the Report, the government made 
it quite clear that in general the policy of protection was to continue. As in the 
case of EPT, the compromise reached was such as to leave the fundamentals of state 
policy unaltered. This basic continuity of policy and the simultaneous element of 
compromise with the contradictory policies of "foreignw capital, evident thmu&out 
this period, m e  taken up in the concluding remarks. 
The Policy of the "Fusion" Government in Respect of the Dominated Classes 
Since this is a complex issue, my remazks are necessarily extremely brief 
and relate to the problem only in so far as the questions hegemony and composition of 
the power bloc are concerned. 
In respect of Black labour: 
1. The segregation measures of this period inasmuch as they relate to the 
maintenance of tribal structures, denial of rights in urban areas, etc., 
are directly repressive measures designed to ensure political domination 
and, by and large, received the support of the whole power bloc. 
2. (a) The Native Service Contract Act, passed by the ETertsog government 
in 1932 and (b) the so-called flIIertzog Bills" of 1936, passed by the 
coslition government, are both concerned primarily with solving the 
problems of apiculture through establishing capitalist relations on a 
sounder basis by (i) increasing control over labour tenants, (ii) curtailing 
squatting, and (iii) helping stem the flow of labour to the towns. (43) 
As such, it is quite incorrect to regard segregation as "the native 
policy of mining", and these policies are not at all inconsistent with 
the hegemony of "nationalv capital. 
3. Much of the hullabaloo surround* the Hertzog Bills related to the fact 
that the franchise and land bills were inextricable, since the Cape Native 
franchise was linked to land qualification and enshrined in the Act of 
Union, and any alteration in the Native franchise would have repercussions, 
particularly on the SAP. Again, it is necessary to distinguish between 
party political and class considerations. 
In respect of White labour: 
1. The Itcivilized labour policyf1 was continued unabated in the interests of 
the whole power bloc. 
2. With respect to the more skilled and petty bourgeois element of white 
labour, the transition to a mors mechanized production and the consequent 
deskilling, meant that their interests were frequently in conflict with 
those of capital. The alliance with '5mtionaln capital, estabPished in the 
Pact period, was thus undermined and found expression at the party political 
level in the split within the Labour Party by the dropping of the 
Creswellite faction from the Cabinet. 
Conclusion 
The terms flfusionlt and coalition which suggest an equal sharing out of power 
cannot accurately describe the "form of state" in this, or a.ny other, period. They 
are descriptive of alliances established only at the "party political1f level, which 
ia in no synonymous with the "sphere of political practices" - the field in which 
concepts of "power bloct1 and hegemony are constituted. However, in order to examine 
"the form of statet8 concretely, we must speciQ its interaction with "the forn of 
r6gime11. A change in "the form of regime" will have definite effects upon the precise 
terns on which hegemony is exercised. 
-
Two factors are important here in respect of the change in the Ifform of 
r6gimeu. Firstly, the new petty bourgeois elements of white labour were no longer 
allied with "national" capital. Secondly, and more critically, there was the . 
disjuncture between the hegemonic faction's interest and its political representation, 
evident in the gold standard crisis. Both of these factors were such as to efect-& 
terms on which "nationalIr capital could exerci~e its hegemony within the "power bloc", 
necessitating some degree of compromise with 'Iforeign" capital. Altho@ "national" 
capital continued to exercise heremony, there wexe definite checks to it, and thus 
state policy in this period, as is evident in the tax on gold, protection, and 
possibly also legislation affecting the control and supply of labour, reveals a basic 
continuity and simultaneously a tendency to compromise with policies advocated by 
" f oreignfr capital . 
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